This paper investigates why firms include warrants in their initial public offerings (IPOs). We use a dataset of Australian IPOs to reexamine the agency-cost hypothesis, which emphasizes the need for sequential financing for relatively young firms, thus reducing the opportunities for managers to squander money on unprofitable projects. We find support for some of its implications, but not others. We also test an alternative theory that focuses on the configuration of securities as a signaling mechanism in a market characterized by information asymmetry. Here again, findings do not support all of the implications.
In our sample of 394 Australian IPOs issued from 1979 to 1990, 134 (34 percent) are package IPOs. Schultz (1993a) reports that 167 of 797 IPOs (21 percent) in the United States included warrants over the period 1986 to 1988. Thus, a nontrivial proportion of firms that go public choose to sell warrants in addition to common stock. As discussed later in the paper, the inclusion of warrants in an IPO might be a response to agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Evidence from U.S. data is consistent with this conjecture.
The second purpose of this paper is to examine an alternative explanation that considers the inclusion of warrants as a signaling mechanism in a setting of information asymmetry.
This research is important for at least three reasons.
First, financial economists have become increasingly interested in the characteristics and configuration of financial instruments issued by firms. As noted above, warrants represent an important source of financing for many firms, but warrants have not received much attention in the finance literature. Our paper provides evidence on the characteristics of warrants and the firms that issue them.
Second, we use a large sample of Australian IPOs to conduct empirical tests of two major theories of package IPOs. Our tests constitute a robustness test of the agencycost hypothesis, and also serve as the first empirical test of the signaling model of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) .
Third, our conclusion that neither theory fully explains the data suggests the need for additional work in this area.
A better understanding of package IPOs is likely to shed light on other financing decisions that involve option-like instruments, such as convertible bonds and convertible preferred shares.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the agency-cost and signaling hypotheses and their testable implications. Section III describes the sample and reviews some of the relevant features of the institutional setting in Australia. Section IV reports tests of the agencycost hypothesis. In section V, we test the signaling hypothesis. Section VI summarizes and concludes.
II. Hypotheses

A. The Agency-Cost Hypothesis
Schultz (1993a) argues that IPOs that include warrants are a type of "stage financing," analogous to sequential financing by venture capital firms. 2 As discussed in the venture capital literature (e.g., Sahlman, 1990) , this sequencing of cash infusions is a response to agency costs associated with free cash flows (Jensen, 1986) .
The advantage of a package IPO is that it bonds the managers to optimal investment decisions. A package offering provides relatively little cash at the IPO, thus mitigating 2 See Schultz (1993a) for a detailed discussion. the free cash flow problem. A PIPO also induces managers to invest in projects that disclose the true prospects of the firm. Failure to make value-revealing investments leaves the stock price below the warrant exercise price, and a second round of financing does not materialize. If the initial investment shows that the project is profitable, the stock price rises, the warrants are exercised, and the second round of financing occurs. If the initial investment reveals the project to have a negative net present value, the stock price falls, and the second round of financing does not occur, as is in the best interests of shareholders.
The agency-cost hypothesis has five testable implications (Schultz, 1993a) . First, firms with greater ex ante uncertainty about their value are more likely to choose PIPOs.
Because there is typically more uncertainty about the profitability of the prospective investments of newer firms, we expect that firms choosing PIPOs will be younger than firms choosing shares-only IPOs (SIPOs).
Greater ex ante uncertainty might also depend on firm size. We hypothesize that package IPOs are more likely to be associated with smaller firms than are shares-only IPOs.
Firms that issue PIPOs have not yet made substantial
investments in products or technologies, and are therefore small in either market value or total assets. Beatty (1989) uses the post-IPO standard deviation of returns as a measure of ex ante uncertainty. Hence, the agency-cost hypothesis also predicts that PIPO firms will have greater return volatility than SIPO firms.
Second, firms are more likely to choose PIPOs when managers will own a smaller post-IPO proportion of the firm's equity, thus reducing their cost of making poor investments.
That is, firms with lower levels of managerial ownership will have greater agency costs and will be more likely to choose a package IPO.
Two implications of the agency-cost hypothesis concern the longer-term viability and financing of PIPO firms.
Because a package offering forces the managers to determine the profitability of the prospective project(s), many firms that use package offerings will discover that they have no positive net present value projects. Thus, the third testable implication of the agency-cost hypothesis is that fewer of the package IPO firms will survive, relative to shares-only IPO firms.
Fourth, the agency-cost hypothesis predicts that those PIPO firms that do survive are likely to receive additional equity infusions because the value-revealing investment has established the attractiveness of their investment opportunity set.
Finally, the agency-cost hypothesis predicts (indirectly) that, after controlling for other determinants of underpricing, package IPOs will be more underpriced than shares-only IPOs. Given their (young) age and (small) size, firms that choose package offerings will have greater uncertainty about their prospects. In turn, greater uncertainty will lead to greater underpricing (see, e.g., Beatty and Ritter, 1986, and Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989) .
B. The Signaling Hypothesis
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) present a competing, but not mutually exclusive, explanation for the inclusion of warrants in IPOs. The focus of their model is information asymmetry, and it allows insiders to have private information about both the riskiness and the quality (expected value) of the firm. "Good" firms, those with high expected future cash flows, can be riskier than, less risky than, or of same risk as "bad" firms. Risk-averse insiders of good firms choose the fraction of equity retained, the degree of underpricing, and the number of warrants (if any) to maximize their utility.
Chemmanur and Fulghieri demonstrate the conditions under which a separating equilibrium exists.
Particularly relevant to our study is their Proposition 3. It shows that if a good firm has sufficiently high risk, its equilibrium strategy includes: equity with warrants (i.e., a package IPO); the warrant subscription price equal to the expected value of the stock; underpricing of the package; and a positive portion of its equity retained by insiders.
The intuition behind this model is as follows.
Underpricing, equity retention by insiders, and the inclusion of warrants in an IPO are all costly signals of firm quality.
Warrants are costly because they mean sharing firm value with warrantholders if a favorable state of nature occurs (that is, the firm demonstrates high value). However, warrants involve this dissipative cost only in the higher realization of the firm's future value, a circumstance under which the marginal value of the firm's cash flows to insiders is relatively low.
Thus, in utility terms, the personal cost to insiders of sharing via warrants is relatively small. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) describe four empirical predictions of their signaling model. First, firms that use package IPOs will have greater variability of future cash flows than will firms that use shares-only IPOs. Second, for PIPO firms, after controlling for the fraction of equity retained by insiders, the proportion of value sold as warrants increases with firm riskiness. About this prediction Chemmanur and Fulghieri state, "We believe that there is as yet no empirical work testing this hypothesis, so that this prediction can perhaps serve as a test of our model." Third, in all IPOs (both with and without warrants), the degree of underpricing will increase with firm riskiness. Fourth, after controlling for the proportion of firm value sold as warrants, the fraction of equity retained by insiders in PIPOs will decrease with firm riskiness.
Although not delineated as a separate implication, the signaling hypothesis also predicts an inverse relation between firm riskiness and the fraction of equity retained by insiders in SIPOs. In section V, we report on our tests of these predictions.
III. Data
A. The Sample
Our sample comprises 396 unseasoned issues of equity made over the period from 1 July 1979 to 31 December 1990. We include in the sample only those IPOs for which a hard copy of the prospectus is available. From the prospectuses, we collect the following information on the sample firms: the offer price; the number of shares and warrants (if any) offered; the names of the underwriter(s) and accountant; the dates of incorporation, first operation and prospectus registration; accounting information such as total assets, total liabilities, and total tangible assets; and issuer share States (Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter, 1988 Main Board listings required a minimum of A$300,000 in shareholders' funds and a minimum of 300 shareholders. The requirements for Second Board listing were a minimum issued capital of A$100,000 and a minimum of 100 shareholders.
In our sample, two-thirds of the IPOs started trading on the Main Board. This relatively high proportion is attributable to that fact that mining firms, all of which traded on the Main Board, constitute nearly one-third of the sample. SIGMA has a mean of 5.15 percent and a median of 4.14 percent.
We calculate the proportion held by issuers (ALPHA) for each firm as follows. We use the offer price to compute the dollar value of the securities issued. We then express this value as a percent of the value of the firm (the dollar value of total shares and warrants, if any), again using the offer price. We refer to this ratio as %OUT. ALPHA is (1 -%OUT), and is 44.5 percent on average, with a median of 49.3 percent.
To measure underwriter reputation (UWRITER), we calculate each underwriter's underwriting frequency, which we define as the number of times an underwriter was chosen to underwrite the sample firms. In some cases, there is a joint underwriting contract. We weight the underwriting frequency by the proportion of shares underwritten. That is, if underwriters A and B are responsible for 80 percent and 20 percent, respectively, of the shares in a given IPO, then we assign underwriter A 0.80 and underwriter B 0.20 of the offering. Typically, the proportion is equal across joint underwriters. As shown in Table 2 , the underwriter-reputation metric has an average value of 9.73, a median of 7.13, and ranges from 0.33 to 31.35. 4 Offer size (ISSUE) ranges from A$0.15 million to A$187 million, with an average of A$9.12 million and a median of A$3.74 million.
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The sample firms exhibit very low debt levels, as indicated by DEBT, the pro forma ratio of total debt to total tangible assets, which has a mean of 0.18 and a median of 0.02. Although not reported in the table, the average ratio of total debt to post-IPO market value of equity (market value of shares plus market value of warrants on day +1) is 9.61 percent, with a median of zero.
DELAY is the number of calendar days between the registration of the prospectus and listing; it has a mean of approximately 60 days and a median of 48 days. Table 3 describes the warrants in the sample of package IPOs. As shown in column (1), the median number of shares per warrant is one, i.e., a package typically consists of one 4 An alternative measure of underwriter reputation is the underwriter's market share, calculated as the dollar value of all shares underwritten by the underwriter divided by the dollar value of all IPOs in the sample. In subsequent analyses, this measure yields nearly identical results. The practice of issuing at-themoney warrants contrasts with that of out-of-the-money warrants in the United States, and is discussed at greater length below.
Column (5) in Table 3 compares the proceeds obtained through the exercise of the warrants with the IPO proceeds.
For the median firm, if all warrants are exercised, the money received is equal to about 58 percent of the proceeds received from the IPO. On average, firms raise 42 percent less money from warrant exercise than from the IPO. In many cases, the warrant is listed in the prospectus as "free of charge." For these firms, the proceeds from warrant subscription (column 5) are shown as zero. Warrants are listed as "free of charge" because of a feature of the Australian tax code. If the warrants are issued at a positive price but are not exercised, the proceeds from their sale are subject to the corporate 6 For 112 firms (83.65 percent), the ratio of the exercise price (X) to the offering price (OP) is equal to one; in six cases (4.45 percent), X/OP is less than one, and the remaining sixteen have X/OP ratios greater than one. The maximum X/OP ratio is 2.5 and the minimum is 0.667. capital gains tax at the time of expiry or cancellation. If they are issued "free" and are not exercised, then there are no corporate or personal tax implications.
It is not entirely clear why all warrants are not issued free of charge, but there is a tradeoff: For shareholders, free options have a zero cost basis for personal capital gains tax purposes. When warrants are not "free," it is common to find them offered for A$0.01.
Only two sample firms' warrants, when exercised, grant a second ("B") warrant in addition to a share. In contrast, Schultz (1993a) reports that nearly 25 percent of U.S. PIPOs contain "embedded" warrants, which suggests a need for more stages of financing by U.S. firms.
The second part of Table 3 partitions the package IPOs into quartiles by issue size. Three empirical regularities are evident. First, as issue size increases, the number of shares per warrant increases (column 1). Because in a majority of issues the X/OP ratio is equal to one, this pattern suggests that for a relatively large offering, proportionately less will be raised by the (prospective) exercise of warrants. The data in column (5) confirm that the ratio of proceeds from the exercise of the warrants to the proceeds from the IPO declines monotonically as issue size increases.
Second, as issue size increases, so does the average exercise price (column 3), primarily because larger offerings are associated with higher per-share offer prices. There is evidence in column (4) that the largest offerings (quartile 4) have the highest X/OP ratios. That is, the largest offerings are associated with the issuance of out-of-the-money warrants.
Third, larger issue sizes are associated with larger dollar amounts of proceeds from the potential exercise of warrants (column 6). Thus, although the proportion of total financing attributable to warrant exercise falls as issue size rises, the absolute dollar value of the second stage financing increases.
B. Australian Warrants
A comparison of our data with Schultz's (1993a) study of U.S. package offerings shows systematic differences between U.S. and Australian warrants:
Χ
Australian warrants have shorter lives than U.S.
warrants.
Χ U.S. warrants are typically issued well out-ofthe-money. Schultz reports that for warrants issued in U.S. packages, the exercise price is roughly 25 percent above the issue price. As noted above, Australian warrants are frequently issued with the subscription price equal to the offer price of the shares. 7 Because the IPOs are typically underpriced, the warrants are effectively in-the-money. This observation suggests that control of agency costs may not be the sole motive for the inclusion of warrants in the IPO. Kang, Kim, Park and Stulz (1995) report that Japanese offshore warrants are "almost" atthe-money.
Australian warrants rarely include embedded ("B")
Χ Australian warrants are not callable; most U.S.
warrants are.
Χ The capital raised from the exercise of warrants relative to the capital raised in the initial offering is lower in Australia (58 percent) than in the U.S. (75 percent).
In Australian PIPOs, the median ratio of warrants to shares is 1:1; for U.S. PIPOs, the ratio is typically 1:2.
We cannot fully explain these differences, but offer the following observations. First, over half of the PIPO sample consists of mining firms.
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In many cases, the firm owns a short-lived "exploration lease" and the proceeds from the offering are used for a detailed geological assessment of the field(s). This process is not time consuming. Therefore, if the field is found to contain sufficiently high concentrations of minerals, the firm will need additional financing soon after the IPO. Given the relatively short life of the warrant, it must be issued near or at the money in order to have any noticeable value.
Second, the inclusion of an embedded warrant creates a 8 Note, however, that a substantial proportion of the mining firms in the sample (60 of 130) chose shares-only IPOs. Further, the mean and median warrant life for non-mining PIPOs (1,044 and 1,041 days) are not very different from those reported in Table 3 (1,037 and 1,023 days).
sequence of three stages of financing: the initial offering, the exercise of the "A" warrants, and the exercise of the "B"
warrants. Firms in some industries can have three or more distinct stages at which additional financing is needed, e.g., product development, test marketing, and full scale production. Stated differently, we suspect that the near absence of embedded warrants in Australia arises because of differences in the investment opportunity set faced by
Australian firms vis-à-vis U.S. companies.
Third, until recently, callable bonds faced a significant tax disadvantage in Australia: Their interest payments were not tax deductible. As a result, Australian investors have had little experience with callable securities. Further, the callability of U.S. warrants is often used to force conversion (see Schultz, 1993b) . Given the relatively short lives of Australian warrants, this feature would be of little value.
Fourth, IPO firms in Australia appear to be earlier in the product cycle than U.S. IPO firms; the median firm age in our sample is less than one year, compared to five years in the United States. (Schultz, 1993a) . This observation could explain why U.S. firms raise relatively more money from the subsequent exercise of warrants than Australian firms: Without established technologies, products, or markets, Australian firms have little need for sizeable cash infusions.
We have no explanation for differences in the warrantsto-shares ratios. The data in Table 4 are consistent with the first set of implications of the agency-cost hypothesis, that firms that use offerings with warrants are younger and smaller than firms that choose shares-only IPOs, and have higher aftermarket return volatility. These findings suggest that a firm with higher ex ante uncertainty is more likely to choose a package IPO. Further, PIPO issuers own a smaller proportion of the firms than do SIPO issuers, a finding that is consistent with the second implication of the agency-cost hypothesis.
IV. Findings: The Agency-Cost Hypothesis
A. Characteristics of PIPO and SIPO Firms
B. The Choice of IPO Type
To test whether the probability that a firm chooses a PIPO is related to the firm-specific characteristics predicted by the agency-cost hypothesis, we estimate the following logit model PIPO sub i~=~{e sup {alpha+x sub i ' beta+u sub i}} over {1~+~e sup {alpha+x sub i ' beta+u sub i}}~, (1) where PIPO i is the probability that the i th firm offers a package IPO and x i is the column vector of independent variables. The logistic regression is: In the logistic analysis, we also include Tobin's q, calculated as in Chung and Pruitt (1994) . If the decision to choose a package IPO depends on the firm's investment opportunity set, there should be a significant relation between Tobin's q and the PIPO indicator variable.
As Table 5 shows, there is no significant association. 12 We also use a Tobit regression, with the same right-hand side variables, to explain the ratio of the proceeds from the exercise of the warrants to the IPO proceeds. The results are consistent with the logistic regressions reported in Table 5 .
C. Failure Rates and Subsequent Financing
One implication of the agency-cost hypothesis is that firms that issue packages are more likely to fail than firms that issue only shares. Schultz (1993a) reports that only 58.8 percent of U.S. PIPO firms survive a full three years after their IPOs, compared with 88.9 percent of SIPO firms.
Following Schultz, we count as surviving all firms that are not delisted n years after their IPOs. Table 6 displays the survival rates of Australian firms one, two, and three years after their IPOs.
In contrast with the U.S. experience, three years after their IPOs, more Australian PIPO firms survive than do SIPO firms, although the difference is not significant. This evidence does not support the agency-cost hypothesis.
We conduct two other tests of the failure rates of PIPO and SIPO firms (not reported). First, we run logistic regressions to estimate the probability of failure within one, two, and three years. The coefficient on the PIPO indicator variable is not significant in any of the regressions.
Second, we define "failure" in terms of two return cutoffs: -50 percent and -70 percent, and track the number of firms that experience cumulative returns less than these cutoffs in each of the three years following their IPOs.
There was no significant difference in the proportion of PIPO and SIPO firms "exceeding" these cutoffs in any year. A seasoned equity offering in Australia takes the form of either a rights offering or a private placement. We consider either of these events to be additional equity financing, and identify the first date after the IPO on which additional financing was received. Ninety-six (52.17 percent) of the SIPO firms made a seasoned equity offering within three years of their IPOs. Of the 90 PIPO firms, 53 (58.89 percent) made a seasoned equity offering over the same interval. Although these proportions are consistent with the agency-cost hypothesis, they are not significantly different at conventional levels (p-value > 0.1, one-sided test).
D. Underpricing
The last implication of the agency-cost hypothesis is that PIPOs are more underpriced than SIPOs. We examine this issue in two ways. First, Table 7 reports the average underpricing for the entire sample, and for the SIPO and PIPO samples. We use four measures of underpricing. The discrete initial return, shown as RRtn1 in the table, is (P 1 -P 0 )/P 0 , where P 1 is the first available traded price (usually, the closing price on the first day of trading) and P 0 is the offer price. The continuously compounded initial return is Ln(1 + RRtn1) and is reported as RRtn2 in the table. We define the discrete market-adjusted return, MAR1, as RRtn1 minus the market return over the same horizon. MAR2 is the continuously compounded equivalent of MAR1, equal to Ln(1 + MAR1). The table also reports median, minimum, and maximum underpricing measures.
For the full sample (n=396), the average discrete unadjusted underpricing is 49.98 percent. For shares-only IPOs, the average underpricing is 40.64 percent; for package IPOs, the mean is 68.57 percent. In spite of the seemingly greater underpricing of package IPOs, the difference in means is not significant at conventional confidence levels (p-value = 0.161).
Three other measures of underpricing reported in Table 7 lead to the same conclusion: in spite of the appearance of differences in the degrees of underpricing between package and shares-only IPOs, the differences are not statistically significant at conventional levels. We also examine underpricing by industry classification and trading location (Main Board or Second Board). We do not report the results, but in no case are PIPOs significantly more underpriced than and underpricing. The evidence in Beatty (1989) , Carter and Manaster (1990) , and Balvers, McDonald, and Miller (1988) shows that IPOs associated with high-reputation accountants and underwriters are significantly less underpriced, presumably because of the certification function that they perform. James and Weir (1990) Ritter (1984) shows that the risk-return relation is heteroskedastic for IPOs. We also observe heteroskedasticity in our data. To correct for this, we use White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix in all the regressions. Table 7 .
When XP.IPO is used in the multivariate setting (regression 4), its coefficient is significantly positive.
As in Regression (2), using this alternative measure of agency cost confirms that firms with larger agency costs are more underpriced. This is consistent with the agency-cost hypothesis.
Regressions (3) and (4) In contrast to Beatty and Ritter (1986) , the positive relation between our proxy for ex ante uncertainty (SIGMA) and underpricing is not significant. However, this finding is consistent with earlier findings on Australian IPOs (Finn and Higham, 1988) . In our sample, the reputation effects of the accountant (AUDITOR) and underwriter (UWRITER), firm leverage (DEBT), firm age (AGE), and trading location (XBOARD) are not significant in explaining IPO underpricing.
The evidence in Table 8 provides mixed support for the underpricing implication of the agency-cost hypothesis.
Regression (3) shows that after controlling for other determinants of underpricing, PIPOs are not significantly more underpriced than SIPOs. Regression (4) uses an alternative measure of agency cost. The results indicate that, consistent with the agency-cost hypothesis, companies with higher agency costs are more underpriced.
V. Findings: The Signaling Hypothesis
The first testable implication of the signaling hypothesis of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) is that firms that use package IPOs have greater variability of future cash flows than firms that do not include warrants in their IPOs.
Because future cash flows are difficult to observe, we use return volatility to measure the variability of future cash flows. Table 4 shows that SIGMA, the aftermarket standard deviation of returns, is significantly higher for PIPO firms, using both parametric and nonparametric tests. The median (mean) is 5.2 percent (7.45 percent) for PIPO firms and 3.43 percent (4.14 percent) for SIPO firms.
As further support for the signaling hypothesis, the logistic regression reported in Table 5 shows that SIGMA is a significant determinant of IPO type (package versus sharesonly). Thus, the data support the first implication of the signaling hypothesis. Of course, riskier firms are likely to be younger and smaller, so the agency-cost and signaling hypotheses agree on the type of firm likely to choose a package offering.
The second implication of the signaling hypothesis is that for PIPO firms, after controlling for the fraction of equity retained by insiders, the proportion of the firm sold as warrants increases with firm riskiness. We test this implication with the following regression (t-statistics in The signaling hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient on SIGMA and the evidence is consistent with this prediction.
As noted by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) , this prediction separates the signaling hypothesis from other theories. Our finding of a significant positive relation between firm riskiness and the proportion of the firm sold via warrant exercise constitutes important, albeit partial, support for the signaling hypothesis.
The third implication of the signaling hypothesis states that for all IPOs (both SIPOs and PIPOs), underpricing increases with firm riskiness. The multiple regression reported in Table 8 shows that there is no statistically significant relation between underpricing and return standard deviation. As noted earlier, this finding is consistent with earlier findings on Australian IPOs (Finn and Higham, 1988 ), but differs from U.S. evidence (e.g., Beatty and Ritter, 1986 ).
The fourth implication of the signaling hypothesis focuses on the fraction of equity retained by insiders. One prediction is that in PIPOs, after controlling for the proportion of firm value sold as warrants, the fraction of equity retained by insiders decreases in firm riskiness. A second prediction is that the fraction of equity retained by insiders in SIPOs decreases in firm riskiness.
Tests of these predictions involve separate regressions for SIPOs and PIPOs. In both cases, the signaling hypothesis predicts a negative coefficient on SIGMA (t-statistics in parentheses):
For SIPOs: ALPHA = 0.500 + 0.182*SIGMA (5 
VI. Summary and Conclusions
Why does a firm include warrants in its initial public offering? The notion that this structure allows for sequential financing and thus reduces agency costs is intuitively appealing. In our sample of Australian IPOs, the evidence is consistent with the implications of the agencycost hypothesis concerning the types of firms likely to choose package offers: PIPO firms have greater ex ante uncertainty, as proxied by age, size, and higher return variability.
Further, PIPO firms exhibit lower levels of insider ownership, which suggests that they have greater potential agency conflicts.
However, two implications of the agency-cost hypothesis lack support in our data. Specifically, PIPO firms do not fail at a higher rate than do SIPO firms, and do not subsequently tap the equity market at a significantly higher rate than do SIPO firms.
Finally, evidence on the relative underpricing of PIPOs weakly supports the agency-cost hypothesis. In general, the Australian data provide less compelling support for the agency-cost hypothesis than does the extant literature. Chemmanur and Fulghieri's (1997) competing, nonmutually exclusive, hypothesis focuses on the configuration of securities as a signal in a market characterized by information asymmetry. Their theory is similar to the agencycost theory in its implications for the type of firm that is likely to choose a PIPO, but has unique implications as well.
Some of these implications find support in our data; others do not. 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 AGE is the number of calendar days from incorporation to listing; SIZE is the market capitalization of the firm, calculated as the post-IPO market value of common stock and warrants (if any); TASSET is the pro forma value of total assets; SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily returns over the first 20-day period, excluding the initial return; ALPHA is the percentage of shares held by issuers subsequent to the IPO; UWRITER denotes the reputation of the underwriter; ISSUE is the size of the offer; DEBT is the firm's leverage, measured by the ratio of total debt to total tangible assets; and DELAY is the number of calendar days from prospectus registration to listing. All dollar values are given in the Australian denomination restated in 1990 dollars. 
Table III Warrants in Sample PIPOs
Description of warrants in sample package IPOs, which are initial public offers of both common stock and warrants. Quartiles are by issue size. The warrants are issued in package IPOs over the period 1979 to 1990. A total of 134 IPO firms in the sample have package IPOs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Package IPOs are offers of both common stock and warrants, and shares-only IPOs are initial public offers of only common stock. AGE is the number of days from incorporation to listing; SIZE is the market capitalization of the firm, calculated as the post-IPO market value of common stock and warrants (if any); TASSET is the pro forma value of total assets; SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily returns for the first 20-day period, excluding the initial return; ALPHA is the percentage of shares held by issuers subsequent to the IPO; UWRITER denotes the reputation of the underwriter; ISSUE is the size of the offer; DEBT is the firm=s leverage, measured by the ratio of that debt to total tangible assets; and DELAY is the number of calendar days from prospectus registration to listing. All dollar values are given in the Australian denomination restated in 1990 dollars. 
Table V Results from Logistic Regressions
The dependent variable is PIPO, which takes a value of one if package IPOs are issued and zero if sharesonly IPOs are issued. The independent variables tested are: SIZE, the market capitalization of the firm, calculated as the post-IPO market value of common stock and warrants (if any); AGE, the number of days from incorporation to listing; ALPHA, the percentage of shares held by issuers subsequent to the IPO; SIGMA, the standard deviation of daily returns for the first 20-day period, excluding the initial return; AUDITOR and UWRITER denote the reputation of the investigating accountant and the underwriter, respectively; MINING takes a value of one for mining IPOs, and zero otherwise; MV1 and MV2 are timeperiod-indicator variables representing pre-1985 pre- and 1985 pre- -October 1987  and Q-Value is Tobin=s q, calculated as in Chung and Pruitt (1994 RRtn1 is the discrete initial return, calculated from the offer price to the first traded price; RRtn2 is the continuously compounded initial return; MAR1 is the discrete market-adjusted initial return; and MAR2 is MAR1's continuously compounded equivalent. Package IPOs are initial public offers of both common stock and warrants, and shares-only IPOs are offers of only common stock. 
OLS) Regressions
The dependent variable is the continuously compounded market-adjusted initial return (MAR2). The independent variables tested are: PIPO, which takes a value of one if package IPOs are issued and zero if shares-only IPOs are issued; XP.IPO, the ratio of the proceeds from the exercise of the warrants to the IPO proceeds; ISSUE, the offer size, restated in 1990 dollars; SIGMA, the standard deviation of daily returns for the first 20-day period, excluding the initial return; DEBT, total debt divided by total tangible assets; AGE, the number of calendar days from incorporation to listing; AUDITOR and UWRITER denote the reputation of the investigating accountant and the underwriter respectively; DELAY, the number of calendar days from prospectus registration to listing; MV1 and MV2 control for the state of the market at the time of the IPO; MINING takes a value of one for mining IPOs, and zero otherwise; XBOARD takes a value of one for Main Board IPOs, and zero otherwise; and OUTLIER takes a value of one for observations greater than 3.5 standard deviations from the mean, and zero otherwise. Standard errors from White's (1980) correction for heteroskedasticity in residuals in parentheses.
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